Although the Turkish armed forces have long been an important political actor in Turkish politics, the 1990s, in particular have been the "golden age" of the military's involvement in domestic and foreign policy.
There is Httle doubt that the military has been the most influential institution in Turkish political life since 1960. Its place, role and influence have steadily increased over the years. It is a constant, everlasting and almost omnipotent party behind the scenes that controls governments and wields veto power. Since 1960, it has been in politics either as supervisor or as decision-maker and intermittently as ruler, in the military interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980-83 and 1997. The domestic role of the military in Turkish politics has been analyzed by many scholars of Turkish historyand politics. i However, less attention has been paid to its role in the making of Turkish foreign policy,2 although, as will be argued, it is too important a participant in crucial foreign policy issues to be neglected. The 1990s, in particular may be called the "golden age" of the military' s involvement in domestic and foreign policy. More rl!cently, starting from the early 2000s, the military has shown signs of retreat from politics due to a combination of domestic and international developments.
This artiele is an attempt to analyze the role of the military in the formation, and to some extent, in the execution of Turkish foreign policy starting from the early 1990s. It is argued here that the military's role in the making of foreign policy is directly linked with, and inseparable from, its place and role in domestic politics and society. Therefore, first of all, it is necessary to give an outline of the civil-military relationship in Turkey.
On a global scale, Turkey represents a paradox in civil-military relations the post-cold war era. Transition to democratic rule has largely been accomplished in the southem European countries in the 1970s and in Latin America in the 1980s. In a different context, the military institutions in the former East European countries have been largely placed under civilian control in the 1990s without any serious problems. In contrast, the role of the military in Turkish politics apparently increased in this period and its praetorian character became visible, especially during the Islamist Refahyol coalition govem'ment of 1996-97.
The rise in the place and role of the Turkish armed forces in the post-Cold War period can be attributed to several factorso StructuraIly, the place of the military is elosely related to the place of the state in a society where civil society is underdeveloped until the 1980s. State-society relations in Turkeyare highly controversial, and without repeating the discussions which have lasted for years, it is suffıce to note that this artiele is based on an approach that considers the state as having a relative autonomy vis-a-vis society.3 The military, as the most important component of the state in Turkey, enjoys double autonomy. First, by virtue of a strong state tradition in Turkey, the military maintains broad autonomy vis-a-vis society in all of its segments. Secondly, it has an autonomous status within the state against civilian politicians and against other bureaucratic agencies. This autonomy is different from what Samuel Huntington defined as "objective" control of the military.4 The Turkish military is not only institutionally autonomous and its promotion procedures are not subject to civilian control and scrutiny, it also has the power and capacity to shirk decisions taken by govemmenL Relying on its autonomous status, the Turkish military represents praetorian charaderistics, a concept that is used to denote the self-assuming function of the military to control civilian authority. As Eric Nordlinger states, military officers became praetorian soldiers when they threaten or use force in order to enter or dominate the political arena. 5 There are certain conditions for a politica! system to have praetorian characteristics. These include the ineffectiveness of the civili an government, the !ack of legitimacy of the civilian regime, the decay of the political system, the tendeney of the military to intervene in the political process especially when the regimes or governments are weak and unstab!e. 6 It should be stated that the Turkish military has combined the two roles of a modernizing military and a praetorian army, and its praetorian character came to the fore when it feared that its modernizing function had faltered. In this sense, the Turkish armed forces have never been a "professional army" in Huntington's terms. It has a!ways ideologically motivated, it has been an institution with a mission, in its own perception, a sacred mission to elevate the country to the leve! of civilized world. However, its modernizing mission has been overshadowed by its increasing praetorian character, especially in the 1990s.
In the military's own ideology, in order to accomplish this mission, the military has to control the civilian governments from behind the scenes and to permeate some of the critical bureaucratic institutions. Therefore, what Peter Feaver called the "civil-military problematique"7 has not been solved in the Turkish case well into the early 2000s, because the military has controlled the civilians for at least the last 40 years.
Historically, the military has been at the centre of the modernization process since the Iate 19 th century, when the Young Turk experience in particular established precedents for military 5Eric Nordlinger, Safdiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments, Englewood-Cliffs, NJ, 1977, p. 3. 6Amos PerImutfer, Political Roles and Military Rulers, London, Frank Cass, 1981, p.II-13, 19 The series of military coups have determined the progress of the Turkish political system and have had significant implications for the civil-military relations and the role of the military as decisionmakers in domestic and foreign policy. After the ı960 and ı980 coups new constitutions were promulgated (in 196 ı and ı982), and with every military intervention, the legal and de facto powers of the military have been consolidated. Since these interventions received public justification, they also endorsed the militaryas an actor of the political system and guardian of the regime. This gaye the military courage and self-confidence for future interventions. Then, with the establishment of the National Security Council according to the ı96 ı Constitution, the military's active involvement in politics has become increasingly legitimized.
Although the Turkish military accepts the legitimacy of civilian authority in principle, Lo it both intervened in the political process, and by using various mechanisms, controlled and infiltrated into crucial civilian institutions. Until the election of Turgut Özal, the presidency was reserved for generals, 11 either retired or as aleader of a coup.
Until the Iate ı990s the director of the National Intelligence Organization (M/l) is appointed from the rank and file of the military, and almost half of its personnel is derived from the military. Beside these important positions held by career military personnel, The Turkish military institutionally regards itself as the guardian and protector of the republic. As Nordlinger puts it "the military have a special responsibility, a crucial mission that transcends their obligations to existing authorities. This is praetorianism' s basic rationale." ı2 The miiitary officers unequivocally state that the military is an important institution because it founded the republic. 13 This is what Koonings and Kruijt call "birthright principle," that the military is perceived to have been present and indispensable at the birth of the nation. 14 The Turkish army has been fundamentally oriented to the fate of the nation, the national destiny, and national progress. Therefore, the military, which is institutionally the most cohesive and organized group in Turkey, holds itself responsible for the destiny of the state. While it is part of the state machinery, it identified itself with the who/e, Le., the state, and considered any social development which it deemed contrary to the principles set out by Atatürk as a threat to the regime. This mission of the military is embodied in its internal rules. Artiele 35 of the Internal Code of the Turkish Armed Forces stipulates that "the task of the armed forces is to protect and safeguard (korumak ve kollamak) the Turkish mainland and the Turkish Republic" which according to the military, provided the legal basis for its interventions and interference in politics.
Even if there had not been any legal basis for action, the military argues that it had the authority to act according to the unwritten rule of "self-assuming task in a situation" (durumdan vazife 12Nordlinger, "Soldİers İn Politİcs ... •" p. 20. 13Hürriyet, January 9.1999; Sabah, June 25,1998 The military's role in Turkish politics has not been questioned nor criticized openly until the Iate 1990s, and on the contrary, it has been sanctioned by the Turkish public. While the Turkish military has displayed a praetorian character, the Turkish social and political culture praises the military and militaristic values. An important indication of that has been the public endorsement of military coups. It is also visible in the ceremonies held when young conscripts dispatch for obligatory military service, and the respect given to career officers. 16 The tradition of stressing the unity of the nation with its army, is a rhetoric widely used by both the military and some civilians. 17 This outlook places the military into a "sacred" position embedded within the aıready "sacred state" conception. Hence, the military's autonomous position within the poliiical system is reinforced by the public support it receives and this has been a factor for its active role in politics.
What sharply distinguishes the Turkish military from other militaries is its involvement in Turkish economy through the Armed Forees ' Trust and Pension Fund, OYAK (Ordu Yardimlasma Kurumu) . Established in 1961, after the coup, this organization' s funds accumulated by 10 per cent contributions of its members' salaries. Channelling the funds to industrial investments, (it has shares in the automotive industry, in cement, transport, and food industries and in insurance and banking) OY AK has become a big holding companyover the years, its annual turnover reaching fıve 
The Rise of Internal Threats in the 1990s
During the i990s, three important developments have contributed to the military's growing role in Turkish politics which eventually affected its role in the making of foreign policy. First, although Turkey had been fighting against Kurdish separatists since 1984. the conflict intensified due to the power vacuum which occurred in northern Iraq after the Gulf War. Secondly, the rise of political Islam in the 1990s eventually brought the Islamist Welfare Party to power. And thirdly, political instability resulted in the inability of the civilian politicians to cope with the political and economic crises and political corruption in this period.
The rise of the political Islam, which gained momentum in the 1990s, caused great concern among the military officers as well as the secular-minded civilian politicians and the public. When the Welfare Party came to power in Iune 1996 in a coalition government with Tansu Ciller's True Path Party. this was the first occasion in the history of the Republic in which an Islamist leader became prime minister. This event brought the polarization of the political system between the Islamists, represented by the Welfare Party and the secular segments of society. ineluding large sections of the mass media and parts of the bureaucracy spearheaded by the military. The military took a very strong stand against the government and contrary to a well-established principle, the generals began to spell out their discontent with the government openly, even to the extent of reprimanding local administrators of the Welfare Party and accusing the Prİme Minister Necmettin Erbakan of trying to İntroduce an Islamic regime. Basing its initiatives on the Artiele 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces Code 19 the Chief of General Staff organized briefings to which top level bureaucrats, journalists and academics were invİted and briefed by the officers about the threats to the secular Republic of 18Birand,"Emret Komutanim," pp.278-280; Business Week, (Istanbul), March 29, 1998 , pp. 24-29. 19Sabah, June 12, 1997 the rising political Islam (including the incumbent government, the Islamist media and Islamist financial and economic institutions, and the Imam-Hatip schools).zO These briefings turned into antigovernment political demonstrations to accentuate the military's determination to protect the secular system and to display the support given to it by the other institutions and groups. The armed forces asserted that the radical Islamists were trying to undermine the secular Republic in cooperation with the PKK and its supporters, and that these Islamists were supported by Iran, Libya, Sudan and Saudi Arhbia.
The tension between the government and the military reached its peak on February 28, 1997 when the National Security Council (NSC) convened for a regular meeting and the generals introduced 18 measures in order to eliminate the danger of Islamic fundamentalism. The civiIian members of the NSC, ironically including Islamist Prime Minister Erbakan, had to sign the final decisions.
Declaring political Islam to be the biggest threat to the regime, the military waged a political struggle not only against the government but also against Islamist groups such as tarikats [the Islamic orders], Islamic business and media. Z1 Consequently, Erbakan was forced to resign, under pressure from the generals. Although the military did not tak e direct control of the government, the "28 February process" was named a "quasi coup" or a "postmodern coup."
The political instability of the 1990s, helped the military to emerge as the most viable and prestigious institution. There were five successive governments in the 1990s and Turkey has had II foreign ministers within a decade. The Susurluk scandal, revealed in November 1996, in which a criminal ultra nationalist and a police chief were killed and a member of parliament severely injured in a car accident, especially tarnished the image of politicians and the ZOSee Ali Osman Egilmez for the text of the briefing. Brifingteki ırtica, Ankara, Tema Yayinlari, 1997, pp. 105-132 . ZlFor instance, the military urged the govemment not to allow the Islamist companies to enter the public bids and to ban purchase from these companies. Milliyet, December 24, 1997; Hürriyet, December 24, 1997. security forces since it unraveled the huge network of underground and illegal connections ranging from drug traffieking to casinos. Although the corruption charges have never been proved, this event turned out to be a symbol of political decay and corruption, with some politicians gaining a reputation as personal profıt-seekers with connections to organized erime.
Thus, the overaıı picture of the 1990s prepared the ground for the military to consolidate its position within the political system. The political void was quickly fıııed by the armed forces which according to public opinion poııs,22 were named as Turkey's most reliable institution. This situation facilitated the military's involvement in politics because as Perlmutter puts it, a modem praetorian govemment is most likely to develop when civilian institutions lack legitimacy.23
The fact that the military's role in foreign policy expanded at the time when the military deelared that internal threats (i.e., the political Islam and ethnic secessionism) replaced extemal threats seems paradoxical. However, as argued in this artiele, having strong eredentials in domestic politics, the military translated its enhanced autonomy to gain more influence in the area of foreign policy.
The Military's Perception of National Security and Foreign Policy
lt is a generaııy accepted fact that the "military mind" is different than the civilian mind or outlook. 24 Military officers coııectively represent a pattem, they have in common the habit of command discipline and the mental outlook of military trainingo The military mind views world affairs solely in the perspective of preparedness for war and is opposed to public debate, dissent and 22Radikal, March 3,1997. 23Perlmutter,"Political Roles...," p. 13 disagreement. Theyare after neat solutions based on either-or propositions. 25 As military influence has increased, so naturally has the opportunity for this type of thinking to shape foreign policy.
The Turkish military is no exception to this general outlook. As a former army general stated in his book about the rise of political Islam, "the military cannot handIe a problem as a social issue, an officer is not a social scientist, he regards those who pose the threat as an 'internal enemy' who may be eve n more dangerous than external enemies".26
However, two points should be stressed at this point. First, although it is possible to talk about a distinct military mind, this outlook is definitely not exclusive to the military. Many civilians may have a similar or even stricter outlook, a type called the "civilian militarist."2? This became evident when some civilian politicians urged the generals for military intervention before the 1980 coup in Turkey,28 or when some academics and writers have taken more hardline stance on critical issues. Second, although the military, in general, is institutionally inclined to exaggerate threat perceptions, their strategic and security evaluations might coincide with reality, as happened in many cases in Turkish security issues in the 1990s.
An important characteristic of the Turkish military's security perception is the unity of the internal and external threats. During the Cold War the socialists were regarded as the proxy of the Soviet Union. The Islamists were seen as the extension of Iran's and Saudi Arabia's intentions to create an Islamic state in Turkey. And lastly, PKK was regarded as merely a tool of hostile countries which was created, supported and, to some extent directed by these countries with the aim to destabiiize and, if possible, to break up the country. In fact, there is an element of truth in this last example to some extent: it 28Birand, "Emret Komutanim," pp. 476-77. was no secret that the leader of the PKK Abdullah Öcalan found a shelter in Damascus for more than a decade and was captured shortly after he left the Greek embassy in Kenya with a passport issued by Greek Cypriots. However, the externalization of problems as well as applying a uni-dimensional approach (that is, military force) to them, have had devastating effects on the diagnosis and handling of these issues.
According to the military, Turkey is a country under constant threat. 29 The military believes that Turkey is encircled by internal and external threats and therefore that Turkey is a unique country in the world. This threat perception has a threefold characteristic: first, historically the big powers have been determined to destabiiize Turkey. For this purpose, so it is believed, they used the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire in the ı9 ıOs and Armenian terrorists in the 1970s, and when the Armenian terrorism was eliminated, the PKK was introduced by these powers. 30 Second, the countries that pose threats to Turkeyare not only the somewhat rivat and hostile neighbors such as Greece, Syria and Iran but also some of Turkey's NATO allies are considered as countries that threaten Turkey's political stability and territorial integrity. This is a long list which includes NATO members such as France, Britain, Holland, Germany and Italy. These countries are seen to have resorted to different tactics and methods to weaken Turkey ranging from using allegations of human rights violations, providing political support for the PKK to forcing Turkey to accept unilateral concessions in Cyprus and the Aegean. Third, according to this perception, those countries may occasionally cooperate with each other. This can take the form of a religious encirclement such as that between Greece and Russia (the orthodox Christians), joined by Armenia, and sometimes an "unholy alliance" Iike Greek-Syrian cooperation and the European Union's support for Greece in its problems with Turkey. In contrast to general NATO trends, with the end of the Co Id War the Turkish military considers threats against Turkey to have increased and intensified, surrounding Turkey with a "circle of fire." Turkey, the "southem f1ank" of the Cold War era, has turned into a "front" country in the new period. 32 This evaluation of security and foreign policy made Turkey a country where both its regime and territorial integrity are under constant threat by intemal/extemal enemies.
The Turkish armed forces maintain a suspicion toward civilians especially on issues of national security. In the military estimation, crucial security and foreign policy issues should not be left to the discretion of the politicians since theyare vulnerable to sectarian interests. Instead, these have to be handled by such an institution as the military which is above the tricks of daily politics. This is why the military insists that national security issues should be bipartisan and above narrow political interests. 33 For the military, foreign policy is a matter of existence and survival (beka) and it is considered solely a national security issue. For this reason, the conception of "nationallstate policy" has been developed to prevent any change by a newly elected govemment in established and formulated policies regarding delicate foreign policy issues. 34 However, not only about the politicians does the military feel insecure but also about the important role diplomats play in the formation and execution of foreign policy. The military has alluded that the Foreign Affairs bureaucracy has been adopting a more conciliatory stance. Some of these differences have even reflected in the new s media. For instance, when the Foreign Ministry agreed not to use the German armoured vehicles in the southeast of Turkey, the military was frustrated by such a pledge. 35 In another instance, the General Staff criticized the Foreign Ministry for not taking a strong stance toward Greece on the Aegean issue, and argued that the 32"Degisen Dünya Dengeleri," p. ıoı; Çevik Bir, "2L.Yüzylldan Türkiye'ye Bakış," Ulusal Strateji, (November-December 1999) While perceiving threats from every direction, the military has, paradoxically, designed a more active international role for Turkey in the post-Cold War world. The generals argue that Turkey has to situate itself in the "new world" as a strong country, a regional power and even a world power which has the capacity to shape regional events. 38 As the deputy Chief of Staff reiterated, Turkey is producing security and strategy, and has a stabilizing factor in the unstable regions surrounding it. 39 Turkey's geographic position, its strong armed forces and the relative weakness of its neighbors are considered big advantages for Turkey in the new international arena. This led to a more assertiye role of the military and the huge defence projects which are estimated to reach 150 billion dollars in the next 25 years. 40 There is indeed nothing surprising about the military's world outlook and its perception of foreign policy, and this outlook may be shared, as previously stated, by some civilians and, more or less by other countries' militaries. But what distinguishes the Turkish military from the others is the degree of its involvement in the foreign policy process.
The Mechanisrns of the Military's Foreign Policy Involvernent
The Turkish military's involvement in the foreign policymaking process is made possible by various mechanisms. Naturally, 36Hürriyet, January 8, 1997. 37Mustafa Balbay, "Genelkurmay ile Dışişleri ve Hükümet Arasında Kıbrıs Konusunda Derin Görüş Ayrılığı Var" Cumhuriyet, December, 29, 2003 , January 5, 2004 Hurriyet, January 5, 2004 . 382Jnci Yüzyilin Jlk Çeyreginde Türkiye'nin Genel Vizyonu, Politikasi ve Stratejisi, Istanbul, Harb Akademileri, 2000 , pp. 1-6. 39Sabah, March 17, 1998 . 40Milliyet, December 18, 1997 the military is part of the foreign policy making process and its knowledge of technical matters, along with its evaIuation of strategic factors and other countries' defense capabilities are required in this process. However, the military's participation in the foreign policymaking process in Turkey has shown different characteristics from cases in Western countries. It moved from consultation to formation and occasionally to the execution of foreign policy.
The most effective mechanism for the military's involvement in foreign policy is the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC was established in 1961 and its powers were enhanced and the number of generals increased with each intervention. While the NSC has the power solely to "convey" its opinions to the council of ministers, according to the 1961 Constitution, this term was changed to "recommend" in the amendment made after the 1971 intervention, and the council of ministers has to give "priority" to its decisions according to the artide 118/3 of the 1982 Constitution. According to the Law no. 2945 issued in November 1983, the NSC is responsible for the determination of the national security policyand preparation of defense policy.41 The NSC sets the agenda of the government on matters ranging from privatization to programs on TV stations, from education to the contents of the posters advertising Turkey abroad. 42
The NSC is not a part of the civilian authority but has become a device designed to control the civilian government by the military.43 Although it is an institution composed of civilian and military representatives, it provides the military with the powers to implement its praetorian functions as evidenced by the automatic approval of its decisions by successive governments.
Especially important in this context is the General Secretariat of the NSC which is headed by a general. The General Secretariat has broad powers especially in shaping the agenda of NSC meetings. Until a change made at the end of 2003, it had the authority to follow up, control, direct and coordinate the implementation of the decisions 4lGencer, "Doksanlarda Türkiye'nin ...," p. 72. 42Bülent Tanör, "MGK'nin Ilgi Alanları," Milliyet, June ı3, ı998; Oktay Eksi, Hürriyet, December 5, ı999.
43Özdemir, "Rejim ve Asker," p. 241.
taken by the NSC on behalf of the president, prime minister and the NSC. As the former deputy General Secretary noted, this body functioned as a consultant to the prime minister,44 and was sometimes defined as the "shadow prime minister."45 However, with the ratification of the sixth and the seventh EV harmonization packages in August of 2003, the hitherto powers of the NSC were curbed to a great extenL The number of civilian members of the NSC had aıready been increased in a change made in 2000, so that the civilians outnumbered the generals. According to the recent changes the General Secretary of the NSC can be a civilian, a critical post which has been filled by a general so far. The important point is that the Secretary General of the NSC has lost the power to communicate directly with other government institutions on behalf of the prime minister. Besides, the NSC is to convene onlyone in every two months instead of its former monthly meetings. These changes have turned the NSC into a cons"liltative body similar to its counterparts in democratic countries.
Related to the NSC are two important documents that draw the outline of the national security policy, shape foreign policy orientation and define threats posed by other states and/or groups. The first of these documents is the National Military Strategic Concept (NMSC) (Milli Askeri Stratejik Konsept-MASK) which is prepared by the Chief of General Staff to determine its own defense requirements. 46 Although it is designed for the organizational, operational and logistical requirements of the armed forces, it also defines the threats and security priorities of the country. The Chief of Staff revised this document in 1992 (the threat of secessionism was added), and at the beginning of 1997 political Islam was included in the NMSC, which was approved at the annual meeting of the Supreme Military Council in May 1997. 47 The NMSC is an important document in the sense that it constituted the basis for an even more important and wider political document, the National Security Policy DocumenL 44Suat Eren, Cumhuriyet, March i5, 1997. There are also "Special Policy Documents" designed to develop the policies and attitudes specifically for each critical security issue. For instance, since 1996, a Special Policy Document formed for northern Iraq gaye the authority to the Chief of Staff and assigned the Special Forces Command to handie Turkey's interests in this region. 48 The national security policies of the state have to be in accordance with this and other related documents. No law or decree can be promulgated and no international agreement or treaty can be signed which would contradict the basic principles of this documenL This document, which has been evolving since 1963, is revised every December of each year and renewed every five years in conjunction with internal and external developments. Although it must be approved by the Council of Ministers, it is not introduced in parliament because it is not a law itself. 49 On the military's initiative, a major change was made in the NSPD to define the threats and to shape the national security policy according to these threats in November 1997. It was declared that internal threats replaced the external ones and political Islam and Kurdish separatism are equally the primary threats to the nation. This was the first time that this confidential and top secret document was leaked to the press, most probably with the aim to squeeze the Islamists and to show the determination of the military to fight against political Islam. 5o The NSPD, sometimes called the "red booklet," is criticized as being a "hidden constitution" and having an undemocratic character since it is prepared by the bureaucracy with the heavy imprint of the military. Particularly the Social Democrats and, in the recent years the Islamists, criticize the existence and influence of both documents and their determining effects on the political life in. Turkey, while the center-right parti es take an ambivalent stance which changes according to the political atmosphere in the country.Sl The then Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan criticized the preparation of NMSC by the military, daiming that this document binds all the governmental agencies and therefore it cannot be set by the military alone and has to be prepared in consultation with, and participation of the government. 52
The military argues that approval of NSPD by the Council of Ministers provides the legal basis for the document which makes it a governmental decree. Besides, many politicians, induding Tansu Ciller and Erbakan, although harsh critics of the document, approved it when they were in power. S3
During the period of high tension between the Islamist Erbakan government and the military, the Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center (PCMC), was established in January 1997, defining crises as the "attitudes and actions against the integrity of the state and nation, and to the democratic order, and social violence, natural disasters, air pollution, migration flows, severe economic crises and huge demographic changes." Although the Center is subordinate to the prime minister, it is organized by the General Secretariat of the National Security Council which has the authority to follow up the crisis situations, to report them and to prepare the necessary precautions. S4 A Crisis Coordination Council was cooperation between Greece and Syria in case of a contlict, and Turkey's need to strengthen its ties with the Central Asian republics. established inside the Center which has the authority to propose the declaration of martiallaw and even war to the related organso55
With this body the military's influence have both covered broader areas and become even more encompassingo Like the establishment of the NSC after the 1960 coup, this has been the institutionalization of the military's praetorianism at a time when political crisis reached its peak in 1996-97, eventually resulting in the resignation of the Islamist led govemment.
As a sign of the interest and involvement in foreign (and domestic) policy the Chief of General Staff has formed various departments such as "Internal Security Department" and "Eastem Working Group" for the fight against the PKK, "Barbaros Working Group" when the Greek Cypriots decided to purchase S-300 missiles, "Trust Working Group" for the Cyprus issue in general and the "Westem Working Group" for the rise of the political Islam0 56 The term "Westem" was chosen on purpose to show the Westem orientaı ion of the country o Apart from these institutionalized mechanisms, an important development which took place in the 1990s was normalization of public declarations Of the high ranking military officers criticizing, waming ,and complaining about other countrieso For instance, Iran was branded as a terrorist state, and Chief of General Staff ısmail H. Karadayi sent aletter to the NATO members criticizing Russia0 57 Generals on many occasions issued stern "wamings" to Greece, Iran, Syria, called for a solution and asked for the start of a negotiation process for the existing problems, and expressed their opinions on various issues of Turkish foreign policY058 It is interesting that statements and headlines such as the "military's foreign policy," or "General Staff raged about the Greeks"59 became commonplace in this period o naturally made the militaryan active participant in the decisionmaking process and enhanced their official contacts with other countries. However, the Turkish military's influential role in foreign policy was felt in more crucial areas such as the relations with the US, Israel and Greece, and in the Cyprus and Kurdish issues.
The Military and the US
The Turkish military occupies a central role in relations with the US since Turkey's relations with that country are based primarily on military and strategic ties. The military's direct links with the US cover many areas such as military training, US military aid and arms procurement and military planning in NATO.
The "German school" within the Turkish military of the i930s was replaced in the 1950s by a group of military officers who adopted the US style of training, as the US military assistance started and Turkey's relations with the US developed rapidly. This group constituted the top ranking generals in the 1980s. For instance, both former Chiefs of General Staff Necip Torumtay and Necdet Öztorun were awarded medals by the US President Reagan. 61 This line of argument, which has its roots in the leftist version of Kemalist thought, represents the militaryas a bulwark against globalism which requires weak nation-states. Therefore, the military, beginning from the 1990s, has been breeding the idea that secular public and institutions should raIly around it in its struggle against these international pressures for broader rights for ethnic groups, and reconciliation toward moderate Islam.
It is possible to see the indications of the military's discontent with the US policies in a 1999 booklet published by the Chief of General Staff. The booklet lists the following major concerns: the US allowed the opening of a Kurdish institute in the US whiIe there is not any Turkish institute, banned the sale of the Cobra attack helicopters, did not take any measures against the Greek and Armenian lobbies which work against Turkeyand teaching of Armenian genocide in some school s in the US, and finally that US policy is based on double standard on human rights issues. 75 72These include the social democratİc intel1ectua!s centered around the Cumhuriyet newspaper and former leftists the Aydinlik group. 73Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, "Artık i2 EylUl Askeri Yok," Cumhuriyet, August 16, 1998. Kislali was assasinated in November i999 and military ordered the officers to attcnd his funeral. 74For the al1egedly US plans to create a Kurdish state İn northem Iraq and the reaction of the Chief of General Staff to these plans see Hasan Böğün, "ABD Belgelerinde Türk Genelkurmayı," Teori, (April 1998), p. 10-56; Doğu Perinçek, Avrasya Seçeneği, Istanbul, Kaynak Yayınları, 1996, pp.94-I02. 75Güncel Sorunlar, Ankara, Genelkurmay Baskanlığı, 1999. Excerpts Sabah, November i 1,1999; Hürriyet, January 9,1999.
There were also indirect signs in the US attitude toward the Turkish military toward the end of the ı990s. While the US newspapers such as The New York Times criticized the generals as being meddlesome and inclined to human rights violations, masterminding the occupation of the Northern Cyprus and waging a bloody war against the Kurds,76 the influential experts on Turkey such as Henri Barkey argued that the Turkish military is a barrier to overcoming the political crisis Turkey has been through in the ı990s. During the political crisis in ı996-97 the US officially warned the Turkish military not to stage a coup.77
lt seems paradoxical that all these disagreements, SuspıclOns and concetns developed while Turkey cooperated with the US widely in tpe 8alkans, the Caucasus-Central Asia and became the crucial ally in the "double containment" policy toward Iraq and Iran which required the military's active participation.
Before the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003, when the US demanded to use TurKish territory to make imoads into the northern Iraq, the Turkish Parliament votcd down the request. This normal, democratic process in itself was severely criticized by the US and interestingly, the Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz openly accused the Turkish Armed Forces for its lack of strong leadership which had been expected from them in this critical moment. 78 Worse still, the US soldiers raided the office of the Turkish Special Forces in Suleimania, in northern Iraq, and detained ı ı Turkish officers for more than 24 hours. Because this operation seemed to be timed to coincide with the 4 th of July, 2003, Turkish officials could not reach any senior American counterparts to discuss the issue, and this event has dealt a serious blow to the relations between the two countries. Grounding their allegations on the "preparation of a plot against the Kurdish major of the town" the US conducted a raid which seemed to 
The Military in the Turkish-Greek Disputes and the Cyprus Problem
Turkish-Greek relations and the Cyprus problem have been main areas of the military's involvement in foreign policy since the early 1960s. These two interrelated problems have been the main security issues for Turkeyand the two countries have come to the brink of war many times in the last 40 years, in 1974 during Turkey's intervention in Cyprus, in March 1987 and in 1996 over the disputes in the Aegean, and in the second instance, Turkish forces landed on a disputed islet in the Aegean.
The Turkish military's approach to problems with Greece is based on the stereotype, which is also very common among the civilians, that Greece is an expansionist country whose foreign policy is shaped by the "megali idea" (the "great idea" of reclaiming the [ost territories now in Turkey) and that Greece is traditionally backed by foreign countries.7 9
Conceming the territoria[ waters dispute in the Aegean, Turkey's approach based on the declared "casus belli" policy. That means, if Greece extends its currently six mi[es territoria[ waters to 12 miles, Turkey considers this action as areason for war. This approach automatically brings the militaryas the foremost important element in this particular issue. As for the Cyprus problem, the military has long been arguing that Cyprus is a strategically vital issue for Turkey. This strategic consideration stems from the perception that Turkey's westem and southem coasts should not be controlled by the same power, especially if it is not a very friendly neighbor such as Greece. This is considered as a strategic encirclement especially after the Greek and Greek Cypriot agreement on common defence in ı995. This was basically the reason for the Turkish military's strong reaction against the Greek Cypriot plans to deploy Russian made 5-300 missiles on the island. The military's approach to the issue became even c1earer when Chief of General 5taff Himli Özkök stated in early 2003 that "if Turkey looses Cyprus, the process of the Turks' imprisonment in Anatolia would be completed" and in an interview he pointed out that "in case any hostile power (Le., Greece) maintains a stronghold on the island, especially when it uses its air force, Turkey's whole eastem region will be within its reach ... any air force deployed there is a big security threat for Turkey. And even membership in the EV will not provide any guarantee in such a situation. We have to have a wider vision."80
The fact that Turkey maintains 30,000 troops on the island gives the military an upper hand in both shaping Turkey's position toward the issue and the political developments in Northern Cyprus.S1 The military has had developed a c10se alliance with the strong leader of the Turkish Cypriots, Rauf Denktaş and has for a long time been able to preserve the status quo. The Turkish military has not only played the !eading role in the confrontational aspects of the relations, but also joined various reconciliation efforts in the Iate 1990s. The Chief of General Staff invited his Greek counterpart to Turkey,82 pushed for confidencebuilding measures in the Aegean, offered to hold joint exercises and prepared reports for possible solution of the problems between them. These efforts were most probably an attempt to ease the tension in the Aegean in order to intensify the fight against the Kurdish separatists. 83 Therefore, the military appeared both as the advocate of the hard-Iine policy, and if necessary, of reconciliation.
In general, the Turkish Armed Forces are the most important factor in Turkey's Greek policyand any policy change in this area would at least have to be approved by the militaryas this issue is regarded a "national and/or state policy.84 For a while in the mid-1990s there has been a two-Iayered stmcture in the making and execution of foreign policy.87 While the government was trying to make overtures to the Islamic countries such as the signing of a pipeline deal with Iran and to realize Erbakan's dream of establishing an Islamic commonwealth, during Erbakan's official visit to Libya, General Çevik Bir, who was perceived as the "foreign minister" of the armed forces at that time,88 was simultaneously accusing Iran of being a "terrorist state" in a speech he delivered in the US.89 Thus, the so-called "Turkish-Israeli axis" was initiated, negotiated and, to a great extent, conducted by the Turkish Armed Forces.
Turkey's Growing Ties with Israel: And Alliance Forged by the Military

The "Military Solution" to the Kurdish Problem
The Kurdish problem has posed one of the biggest challenges to both the territorial integrity and the political system of Turkey. It has not been an exelusively internal problem but also a foreign policy issue since it has affected Turkey's relations with its neighbors, rivals and allies alike.
In ffiilitary discourse and practice there was not a "Kurdish" political problem but only a problem with PKK terrorists, thus there was no need to produce any political solution. The military force was taken as the only instrument required to solve the problem. While the military criticized politicians and especially the Özal governments (1983-91) of underestimating the urgency of the problem and of not taking necessary measures, the other countries ineluding Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, Greece, Armenia, and the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, Russia, Denmark were criticized for providing direct and indirect support to the PKK.90 Therefore, the Kurdish problem was see n a part of the general plot to weaken and destabilize Turkeyand any reference to "political solution" or cultural rights is considered as the first step toward autonomy and eventually to a separate Kurdish state. 91
The military's role in this problem ranged from the actual Jighting to arms purchases and conducting diplomatic initiatives when and if necessary. Between 1984 Between -1993 , the fight against the PKK was carried under the control of the Interior Ministry, and the Chief of General Staff was only providing the necessary troops and equipment. 92 Replacing the internal threat (i.e., the PKK) for the external threats based on the Soviet Union and Greece the armed forces prepared a "Strategic Internal Threat Report" in November 1992 based on the Artiele 35 of its internal regulations. 93 Then the military put into practice several measures in its fight against the PKK on its own initiative. As part of a diplomatic initiative, the Commander of the Gendarmerie, General Eşref Bitlis, went to Arbil Starting from 1993, Turkey has adopted a new strategy, what the Chief of General Staff Doğan Güreş named the "Iow intensity conflict," against the PKK. it moved from defensiye to offensive strategy in the conflict, based on the concept of "field control," (until then the PKK was controlling much of the area especially at night time) deploying more troops, using infrared night vision equipment and attack helicopters. 95
The other leg of this policy was the cross-border operations into northern Iraq where the PKK increased its activities and launched its attacks. Turkey's operation in March ı995 was the biggest military action outside its borders involving around 50,000 troops. Yet the most striking development was the military's operation in northern Iraq in May ı997 which was carried out without even notifying the government at that time headed by the Welfare Party, claiming that it might leak the information to the PKK.96 In another instance, the armed forces, launching an operation inside northern Iraq in April ı998, captured Şemdin Sakık, one of the leaders of the PKK, again without the prior knowledge of the government. 97 The important point in these two cross-border operations was that neither of the two governments (Erbakan in the first and Mesut Yılmaz in the second event were prime ministers) nor the public reacted to the military's decision to launch such operations, and Ecevit as deputy Prime Minister in ı998 stated that the Chief of General Staff did not need to consult the government for every action. 98
The developments which led to the expulsion of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan from Syria was initiated by the Commander of Land Forces when he warned Syria during an inspection of the 94ÜmitÖzdağ, Türkiye, Kuzey Irak ve PKK, Ankara, ASAM, 1999 , p. 95. 95Milliyet, Oetaber 11, 1998 . 96Milliyet, May 19,1997 . 97Milliyet, April 14, 1998 . 98Cumhuriyet, April 15, 1998 [VOL. XXXIV troops near the border that "Turkey has lost its patience and it is ready to take necessary measures (against Syria)."99 During Öcalan' s stay in Italy, the military severely criticized this country and other NATO members for their lax attitudes toward terrorism and the Chief of Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoglu publicly stated his anger, disappointment and feeling of betraya!. 100 While the capture of Öcalan lOl and the eventual defeat of the PKK were important events in the development of the Kurdish question, they did not bring an immediate change in the military's role in this issue. The military, arguing that it has accomplishedits duty successfully, urged the civilians to take measures and especially to foster the economic and social development of the region. The military still avoids any mention of cultural and political measures in the region and resisted proposals to lift the emergency rule in the Southeast of Turkey until the beginning of the 2oo0s.10 2
The Rise of Civil Society and the Jssue of E.U. Membership: toward the Retreat of the Miluary from Politics?
Since the 1990s, the military's influential position in Turkish politics has begun to be challenged domestically by the rising civil society and externally by the EU and the US.
With the impressive economic boost realized during the Özal governments in the 1980s, the business circles sought to exert more influence on political power and along with the liberal policies, urged a more limited role for the state, including the military.
In the 1990s, while the leading businessmen talked about the adaptation of a "Basque model" for the solution of the Kurdish issue, the Turkish Chambers of Commerce and Stock Exchanges (TOBB) prepared a report on the Kurdish problem, taking a critical stance toward the government policyand also drawing parallels with the 99Milliyet, September ı7, ı998.
lOOCumhuriyet, December 15,1998. Basque region. 103 The Istanbul-based big business represented by TUSIAD (Turkish Businessmen' s and Industrialists' Association) put forward its democratization package in January 1997, which openly called for a more limited role for the military. These suggestions included, inter alia, the subordination of the Chief of General Staff to the Defense Minister instead of the Prime Minister, and the abolition of the National Security Council and returning it to its pre-1960 formation whose powers, unlike the current constitutionally established NSC, should be defined by law. The Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center is, too, regarded an unconstitutional institution which needs to be abolished. 104 The military's reaction to the report was rather harsh. Although it did not directly address the report, the General Staff accused the proposals of unjustly attacking and discrediting the military and those who held such opinions either being in treason or in ignorance. ıo5
The well-organized Turkish business, as an influential pressure group, seems to have a different perception of world politics in the post-Cold War era. While the military stresses the importance of a strong Turkey that aspires to be a regional power, the business circles ask for an economic and trade-oriented foreign policy that manifests itself in the report prepared by TUSIAD named "Toward a New Economic and Trade Diplomacy Strategy in Turkey."106 Liberal writers and commentators l07 have especially intensified their criticisms of the military's role in politics and human rights violations, and have started to question ambitious defense projects.
The second challenge to the military's role in Turkish politics came from the EV which has generally been very critical of democratization and human rights problems in Turkey but has intensified its criticism after it named Ankara as a candidate in the EV's Helsinki Summit in December 1999.
The preconditions of the EV for Turkey's full membership put the military in a dilemma. The military has traditionally spearheaded Turkey's modernization efforts and its integration into the Western world. As one general stated, it is the direction the founder of the Republic, Kemal Atatürk, pointed to the Turkish people and integration in the EV is part of this project. It is worth recalling that despite the critical attitude of the EV toward the military regime between 1980-83, the generals took a decision that Turkey was committed to the membership in the EV. lOS On the other hand, full membership in the EV would directly affect the military's status and role in the political system. The EV regards the National Security Council as an undemocratic institution. 109 Besides, the military is discontented with the EV's approach to the Kurdish problem and human rights issues as well as the EV's position on the Cyprus question and the Aegean dispute. In order to overcome this difficulty, the top brass argued that Turkey, unlike EV members, has its own characteristics which require the existence of such an institution. 11O The Turkish military has lost its allies both domestically and externally. Big business supported the military's active role in politics in the early 1980s, but when it felt secure that there was no immanent social unrest threatening its position, it set itself the taSk of redesigning the Turkish society and polity which includes an "objective civilian control of the military." The military has engaged in a problematic relationship with smail and medium scale business, which it considers to be "green capital" i.e., having Islamist (OSMehmet Ali Birand, Türkiye'nin Gümrük Birliği Macerası: 1959 -1996 , Istanbul, Bilgi, pp. 374-78. (09The Economist, Mareh 16, 1997 Sabah, February 22, 1997 . llOSee for instanee ılter Türkmen, Hürriyet, Deeember 28, 1999. tendencies and acting as the financial backbone of political Islam in Turkey. This military attitude alienated these Anatolian based entrepreneurs. This led the military to cooperate with a smail number of secular minded elites, most of whom come from bureaucratic backgrounds, though it also deals with some former socialists, so me social democrats, and even some right-wing nationalists.
Externally, while the military's active role in politics was tolerated by the Western European countries for the sake of international strategic balances in the Cold War environment, in the post-Cold War era the place of the military in Turkish politics has been severely criticized and the reduction of the role of the military has been made one of the preconditions for an eventual candidacy status. And the US, long standing ally of the Turkish military, has in various ways asked for the withdrawal of the military from politics.
Although concerns over political Islam see m to continue into the preseni, Kurdish separatism has lost its momentum since the capture of Öcalan and stabilization of relations with Syria. In the absence of an immanent internal and external threat, the military's discourse that Turkey's peculiaritics require them to play a greater role looses its rhetorical power.
A combination of these factors seems to lead the military to retreat to its orrginal functions, the protection of the country from external threats, providing security, and a merely consultative role in t~e making of foreign and security policy.
